China Policy In The Next Administration, Part 2

Tariffs, Chaos and More: What Trump and Harris will bring to China policy

Welcome to Part 2 of China policy in the next U.S. administration. In Part 1, we described the China landscape in which the new president, whether Harris or Trump, will navigate. Today, we look at what might be the policies of the next administration. Let’s start with Trump.

Trump Administration

It’s become fashionable in some quarters to note that Biden’s China policy is not all that different from Trump’s. And it’s true that Biden maintained Trump’s tariffs and indeed tacked on more. But policy is not just about specific policies such as tariffs, it’s also about approach and goals. Before we get into specific policies let’s note four foundational factors necessary to understanding a second Trump administration China policy.

Chaos

Trump is the Pigpen of chaos, spreading it wherever he treads. This is as true in foreign policy as it is in general. Earlier this summer he caused a ruckus over Taiwan. He complained that Taiwan “should pay us for defense…”You know, we’re no different than an insurance company,” he grumbled. Taiwan has doubled its defense spending with steady increases the last seven years. Given the China threat, it should do more. But the point isn’t about the details, it’s the Trump blustering approach. It’s easy to forget four years later how chaotic the first Trump administration was, accentuated by Trump’s addictive need to be in the news constantly, to always be the center of attention, which only provides more opportunities for mayhem.

Transactional

Trump views everything in his life as a transaction. It helps to drive his obsession with trade deficits, or membership in NATO. It will inform how he approaches all foreign policy issues, including China-related ones. Each and every one of us, whether person, group or country, is always and everywhere an entry on his ledger. This doesn’t necessarily have to be bad except in Trump’s case—

He Can Be Bought

When every issue is transactional and when your main motivation is yourself, than you are easily bought. Trump in his first administration advocated for banning TikTok, and his administration took steps to force it to sell to American buyers. But this year, after meeting with megadonor Jeff Yass, who is a major investor in TikTok, Trump reversed course. Trump is now an advocate for TikTok. In a Trump administration no policy stands are set in principle—find the right financial leverage and you can get him to change his position.

Sympathy With the Devil

Trump likes dictators. It’s his particular peccadillo, his fetish for evil.  During his 2016 campaign, Trump said of Vladimir Putin, “It is always a great honor to be so nicely complimented by a man so highly respected within his own country and beyond.” And just recently he said, “North Korea, Kim Jong-un liked me a lot.” Trump has a love of dictators and an authoritarian instinct.

So in assessing what would happen in a second Trump administration we need to keep these four foundations in mind: there will be chaos, Trump will be transactional, he can be bought and he has sympathy for the devil. With that in mind, let’s think through a second Trump administration China policy.

Tariffs

This is an easy one. Trump has already said he’ll raise tariffs on China by 60 percent or more. “Maybe it’s going to be more than that,” he said (chaos!). So whatever else happens in a second Trump administration, no one should be surprised when it institutes more and higher tariffs on China…and probably on a whole raft of other countries. Remember in his first administration, Trump didn’t just impose tariffs on China, he did so on Japan, European countries and many others. Tariffs are a bludgeoning tool for Trump. He does not wield it carefully like a scalpel to achieve specific ends, but rather like a drunken Thor he hammers all around the world, ally and foe alike.

He is Unlikely to Wield the Immigration Tool

Trump’s foundational belief is anti-immigration. It’s the issue he led off with in his 2016 campaign and what he often emphasizes in this year’s election. Immigration could be one of America’s most effective tools in dealing with China. China, because of its authoritarianism and oppression, doesn’t attract people to live there. America, for all its challenges, does. Millions of people still want to move to America, including Chinese. China wants to build up its strategic industries but it will be more difficult to do so if talented Chinese leave the county. And Chinese are leaving in record numbers. The U.S. wants to build up its strategic industries, too. But it will be more difficult to do so if it doesn’t attract talented immigrants, including from China. A second Trump administration is unlikely to open up immigration from China, leaving a powerful tool on the floor of the foreign policy shop.

Fights Within the Administration

Trump himself is fixated on the trade deficit but likely as in his first administration there will be a mix of staff with differing opinions on the China challenge and what to do about it. There will most certainly be China hawks who will work for strict policies in dealing with China. People like Matt Pottinger who served as deputy national security advisor during the first Trump administration. In an April article in Foreign Affairs, Pottinger asserts U.S. foreign policy should not be about managing the competition with China, which he says is current Biden administration policy. Rather, Pottinger says the U.S. should work to win the competition.

His recommended policies to do this include increasing defense spending to deter China, especially with regards to Taiwan; severing China’s access to key technologies; reducing U.S. economic reliance on China; and promoting information campaigns to counter China’s propaganda. But will Trump adopt these policies? If Pottinger-like staff propose decoupling from China in a certain industry, can Trump be bought off as happened with TikTok so that he decides not to decouple?

Pottinger also proposes building stronger alliances and trade agreements with countries. But Trump is not known for building alliances. He’s America First. And others in a second Trump administration are likely to push to the forefront general trade policies rather than specific China ones. They’ll want to impose tariffs on countries such as Japan, Vietnam and others, all countries that currently we are working with to varying degrees to contain China’s expansionist tendencies. It will be hard to build alliances with countries on which we are imposing tariffs.

One of the main battle lines in a second Trump administration is likely to be between those who want to confront China through smart alliances and those for whom trade policy, regardless of country, is paramount.  There will also likely be tension within the administration on Taiwan. Some will want to increase our defense spending and provide arms to Taiwan, while others will want Taiwan to take a larger role in its own defense, including Trump himself, and punish Taiwan if it does not meet Trump’s spending requirements.

Of course, every administration has its own battles over policy, China or otherwise. The Biden administration has its own China hawks and doves. The Trump administration will not be unique in this case but it’s possible even now to see where some of those tensions and disagreements within the administration will take place.

Harris administration

Understanding a possible Harris administration is more difficult. She does not have a foreign policy record like Trump does. And it’s not clear where she stood on China policy issues during the Biden administration. But we know like the Trump administration, like any presidential administration, a Harris administration will have its own internal battles over China policy.

It is unlikely, barring events forcing her hand, that China will be a main focus early in her administration. She is more interested in domestic issues and her campaign thus far has put those issues front and center, which is to be expected since usually foreign policy is not a winning campaign issue. This will make who she picks as her foreign policy team even more important.

Who Will Lead?

She has already indicated she will replace Secretary of State Blinken, national security advisor Jake Sullivan and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin so there will be a new foreign policy team in place. Who she replaces them with will go a long ways towards determining what a Harris China policy will be. Harris’s current national security advisor, Philip Gordon, is a Europe expert. And he also has some experience with the Middle East. Reportedly Harris is keen to replace the current triumvirate because of her disagreements with them on Gaza policy. In her search for new foreign policy leaders for her administration, will Israel-Gaza be the main focus driving the search or will views on China be more important? And if the latter, what type of China experts is she looking for?

Harris’s Foreign Policy Experience, or Lack Thereof

Harris herself does not have a tremendous amount of foreign policy experience though during her time in the Senate she served on the Intelligence and Homeland Security committees. In the Senate, Harris was supportive of Hong Kong and talked about Uyghur human rights issues, but that’s often the case for senators, a position where it is easier to advocate for human rights, than when one is in the executive office. Once president, it would not be surprising if she did not lead with human rights issues, most presidents don’t (though we wish they would. Our book, Challenging China explains how advocating for human rights is an underrated foreign policy).

Walz and China

Her vice presidential candidate, Tim Walz, does have lots of experience with China. As has been reported, he taught in China when he was a young man, brought student exchanges there and even spent his honeymoon in China. Republicans are trying to use this to negatively paint Walz. But experience with and in China should be a positive. And while serving in the House, Walz focused on human rights issues with China. He met with activists from Hong Kong and China, and even met with the Dalai Lama. He co-sponsored several resolutions demanding the release of Chinese dissidents and supported the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. Will Walz have any influence on China policy in a Harris administration? It’s impossible to know at this point, but at the least there will be a voice in the administration with on-the-ground experience in and with China. How that experience will inform Walz’s advice, and whether he will have a voice in China policy, will impact what a Harris administration’s China policy will look like. In trying to answer those questions we can only cite the three most underused words in the English language, “I don’t know.”

Tariffs Rule

What we do know about a Harris China policy is it will almost certainly be protectionist, continuing the tariffs of the Trump and Biden administrations. The United States has embraced protectionism—it is now the political norm. It is unlikely Harris will break from that norm.

The Role of Allies

Biden was tougher on China, at least rhetorically, in the first two years of his administration. But allies became worried as words sharpened and tensions rose and they reportedly cautioned Biden to tone it down. Indeed he heard this at meetings in Bali in late 2022. And from that point on, the Biden administration did rachet its rhetoric down and some would argue its policies were not as tough either. Harris will face similar pressure from countries who worry about what they perceive as dangerous escalations in the U.S. - China relationship. It is a different world from 2020 and a different U.S. political environment and both will influence what Harris can and cannot do.

Regardless of a Trump or Harris Administration

Large parts of the Republican Party have morphed into Republicans from the 1930s, isolationist and like their ancient cousins not viewing America’s role  as one that should be involved with issues outside of the country.  Allies of the United States, whether in Europe, Asia or elsewhere, have adjusted to this reality, first manifest in the previous Trump administration, and they plan accordingly for a future where the U.S. cannot be relied on to be a world leader.

Because of this, new alliances have developed such as India and Japan committing to greater security cooperation or India and Vietnam holding maritime security discussions or any number of other examples of countries building alliances and providing help to each other outside of any U.S. influence or efforts.

Europe has awoken to the reality that it may have to defend itself against Russia, or at least that it must be at the forefront of that effort. This reality might affect European policy towards China.

A world that can no longer count on the U.S. as a security blanket is one that will rearm. Countries from Japan to Finland are increasing defense spending. And it will not be surprising if part of that rearming includes nuclear weapons. That will likely occur in both Asia and the Middle East.

With a United States that is committed to protectionism (and a China that has long been decoupling) we will see a less efficient world economy. The anti-globalist movement will not see the end of globalization but it will see a global economic engine with far more friction than the previous thirty years. Economic lessons may, or may not, be learned from this.

Regardless of who wins in November, Harris or Trump, this is the world they will be operating in. One with authoritarians more ambitious, countries developing new alliances, everybody rearming, and a global economy with far more frictions. Good luck to the new president!