Seven Reasons Why I Think China Will Invade Taiwan and One Why I think It Won’t
Let's hope the one reason prevails
Worrying about China invading Taiwan is not a new worry. But it has taken on more urgency in recent years. First, after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Overton Window for violating other countries’ sovereignty was pushed wide open. Then with the election of Donald Trump which has lead to the return of the 19th century might-makes-right world-order. Plus, China has taken a whole host of actions over the last ten years, which we’ll detail in a moment, indicating its keen interest in seizing Taiwan, whether by military invasion or other means.
Why should we worry about Taiwan? Well, first and foremost, it’s a functioning democracy of 23 million people with their own aspirations who should be allowed to determine their own governing fate. In the old international rules-based order, that was supposed to mean something. Unfortunately, China and Russia worked to change that order, chipping away at it for years. Today, America, under Trump, has smashed it to pieces. But whether or not the leaders of three of the most powerful countries in the world care about sovereignty, freedom and democracy, the rest of us should.
Second, Taiwan is important economically, both in its own right and as an important security point for sea transshipment lanes. Taiwan is famously a major producer of sophisticated semiconductors thanks to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). In fact, TSMC makes 90 percent of the world’s most sophisticated semiconductors (Samsung makes the other 10 percent). But that’s not the only reason Taiwan is important economically. Around a fifth of global maritime trade transits the Taiwan Strait. Each year thousands of container ships and tankers travel through the Taiwan Strait carrying $11.5 trillion in goods and energy. If China takes control of it, then it controls a huge chunk of global trade, making numerous nations dependent on an authoritarian government, one that is bent on expanding its influence and control in the world.
So, Taiwan is important. 23 million people who lose their freedom are important. Semiconductors are a huge input in today’s global economy. The Taiwan Strait is a major transshipment area.
The Trump administration is ostensibly worried about China and countering it is a strategic priority. Various members of the administration have said this in various forums. Some in the administration justify giving up on Ukraine to shift resources to the larger strategic need of countering China.
But does Trump himself care? I wrestle with that question below in reason seven of why I think China will invade Taiwan.
It’s clear China wants Taiwan. But China is likely to use every lever it can to take control of Taiwan before turning to invasion. That includes economic leverage, espionage, political interference and a blockade. But those may not work. Taiwan, like Ukraine, might not go gently into the authoritarian night.
If everything short of invasion fails, there are seven reasons to think China will invade…and one--a very important one!—to think it won’t. I describe the seven below followed by the one very important reason China may not.
Seven Reasons Why
Xi Has Said So
The most obvious reason to believe China will invade Taiwan is that Xi has said so. Repeatedly. In December, 2024, Xi said, “The people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family. No one can sever our family bonds, and no one can stop the historical trend of national reunification.” He has used similar language repeatedly over the years. He has consistently called for the reunification of Taiwan from the beginning of his leadership, as have all leaders in China. So, in some ways it’s easy to assume these are just words. But two points on that. First, in a January 2019 speech regarding Taiwan, Xi said, “We make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means." Second, Xi, when he first took over and since has said the issue cannot be delayed “indefinitely,” and can’t be passed “generation to generation.” But so far China has not invaded Taiwan, has not blockaded it. However, under Xi, China has taken concrete steps so that the Taiwan question will not be passed to the next generation, including building up its military.
Building Up Its Military
Under Xi, China has engaged in a large-scale build-up and modernization of its military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). China’s military budget has more than doubled since Xi took over and the budget increased 7.2 percent this year. China is modernizing its military across all domains, but as the U.S. Department of Defense 2024 China Military Report states, “Numerically, the PRC has the largest navy in the world, with a battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants.”
It's not just that China is increasing its spending and that it is modernizing its military, it’s also how it’s spending its money and what its priorities are. As USAF Brig. Gen. Douglas Wickert said earlier this year, “The pace of modernization that the PLA is going through is unprecedented. It’s far outpacing what we are doing…” China would need to construct an immense number of naval ships to successfully invade Taiwan. Well, it’s building them. Rapidly. China is expected to have 395 ships by the end of this year and well over 400 by 2027. In addition, China has developed its ship-building capacity to such a degree that it now “controls 64.7% of all new merchant ship orders in the world.” As in so many other strategic industries, China has created a ship building manufacturing and supply chain that has achieved global dominance.
Perhaps most worrying for the possibility of an invasion of Taiwan is that Naval News recently reported that “China is building at least five new special purpose barges which appear tailor made for amphibious assault.” The barges are designed to transport vehicles onto shore. Adding to the report, China is proficient at building roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) ships, many of which are used for China’s extensive shipping and supply chain industry. But, China can also mobilize these Ro-Ros for amphibious assaults. In fact, the Foreign Policy Research Institute reports that China “has used these ferries in military exercises in the Taiwan Strait since 2019.”
China is also preparing its military to be resilient against anyone who tries to counter an invasion of Taiwan. The Lowy Institute reports that, “China is advancing preparations for potential conflict, including expanded runways, taxiways, and hardened aircraft shelter at its 90-odd PLA airfields within combat radius of Taiwan.” China has also recently unveiled new fighter-bomber aircraft and is constructing a massive new wartime command center.
China is conducting a large and rapid build-up of its military and among the weapons and capabilities it is constructing are those designed for an assault on Taiwan. Plus, China is practicing—a lot—to invade or blockade Taiwan and not just in its use of Ro-Ros.
Practice Makes Perfect
China continues to up the ante in its military maneuvers in and around the Taiwan Strait, on the sea and in the air. Since 2018, it has conducted at least one major naval military exercise around Taiwan every year And these aren’t random exercises. They are usually, and increasingly so, simulating either blockades of Taiwan or invasions of it. In August 2020, they simulated an attack on Taiwan that included missile tests. In April 2021, as Professor Amrita Jash documents, China “practiced beach landings and assault operations.” In August 2022, China again simulated a blockade, conducted missiles tests and also practiced cyber warfare. In August 2023, they added land-based missile system exercises to their bag of military exercises around Taiwan. Last May, they joined the drone trend and practiced using those modern day weapons as part of a full-scale military exercise. And in October last year they again conducted extensive naval drills and war games. Unlike Allen Iverson, China believes practice makes perfect and China is practicing a lot to blockade and invade Taiwan.
In addition to these military exercises, China also increasingly intrudes into Taiwan’s air defense zone. According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, in 2021, “Taiwan reported an average of 81 monthly incursions by Chinese military aircraft into its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).” That number has doubled with 2024 seeing 178 such incursions monthly.
Cyber Espionage
Nowadays, the cyber world is a new domain for war. As we just showed, cyberwarfare is one of the components of China’s military exercises around Taiwan. But China also commits extensive cyber espionage in Taiwan. In 2023, Chinese state-backed hackers conducted 1.2 million daily cyberattacks against Taiwanese entities. That’s already a lot but it increased in 2024 to 2.4 million. According to Infosecurity magazine, there has been a “substantial rise in People’s Republic of China (PRC) cyber-attacks targeting critical industries in Taiwan. This includes telecommunications (650% increase), transportation (70%) and defense supply chain (57%).” In addition, China is specifically targeting Taiwan’s military and space sectors, including drone manufacturers.
China also appears to have cut Taiwan internet cables. One such incident was in January. PC Magazine reports that “Taiwan's coast guard dispatched a vessel to the site and discovered a Hong Kong-owned cargo ship called ‘SHUNXIN 39’ about 7 nautical miles from the undersea cable. A preliminary investigation has since determined the vessel was likely responsible for the damage.” A variety of other such cable cutting incidents—and I don’t mean you and I canceling our Xfinity accounts—have occurred in recent years. These incidents are both meant to intimidate Taiwan and prepare for a blockade or invasion when China will attempt to cut off Taiwan from the world physically and virtually. In fact, just this week China revealed it has “developed a compact, deep-sea device capable of severing even the most fortified underwater cables.”
China has developed sophisticated technology and strategies for cyberwarfare and is prepared to use them against Taiwan. A Booz Allen Hamilton report puts it this way, “…the strategy calls for using cyber power in a comprehensive way—on political, military, and economic fronts. The aim is to isolate, weaken, and absorb Taiwan in the long run. This is done through spying, stealing data, spreading lies, and beyond. The PRC also targets U.S. critical infrastructure with cyber threats to deter U.S. involvement in the event of a Taiwan crisis.”
Political Interference in Taiwan
China is very much engaged on the information battlefield in its efforts to take control of Taiwan. Small Wars Journal states that China generates “propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation to divide and conquer adversaries. Its political warfare against Taiwan is broad and includes information warfare, cyber warfare, media warfare, legal warfare, gray zone operations, hybrid warfare, and cognitive warfare.” Of course, China uses social media, including TikTok, Facebook and others to transmit messages and propaganda to weaken Taiwan resolve.
This month, Taiwan’s President William Lai announced 17 strategies to counter China’s political interference In a speech quoted in The Taipei Times, Lai said, “For decades, China has never given up its ambition to annex Taiwan and destroy the Republic of China. Not only does it continue to intimidate Taiwan through antagonistic rhetoric and military exercises, but it has intensified infiltration and ‘united front’ work.”
China’s political interference is part and parcel to its cyber espionage and is all part of a grand strategy to weaken Taiwan—so that it either gives up without a fight or is less capable during an invasion.
Building up Supply Chains and Becoming Less Vulnerable to Sanctions
Part of this grand strategy is to make China less vulnerable to outside pressure should it invade Taiwan. For years, China has built up its supply chains, making them less reliant on outside components, especially in mission-critical industries. In fact, even as China exports more, its imports have been flat. The latter is partly due to weak consumer demand but also because of importing less components for assembling final product. Increasingly, China is making every part of its products, controlling the entire supply chain. In fact, in recent years, China has identified “choke points,” areas in strategic supply chains where China is reliant on foreign parts from the United States, Japan and Europe. Once identified, China is working to become self sufficient in those parts of the supply chain.
China learned from Western sanctions placed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine and is working to become less vulnerable to such sanctions. Of course, in addition to working to control most or all of the supply chains in critical industries, China has also made itself less vulnerable by becoming by far the largest manufacturer in the world, accounting for around a third of global manufacturing and 18 percent of global trade. Unlike Russia, countries that try to sanction China could face large disruptions in their consumer and industrial markets. Of course, this goes both ways—because China is so export dominant, it will severely affect its own economy too. Nonetheless, China is working to become less vulnerable to sanctions and other global fall-out that could occur if it blockades or invades Taiwan.
Trump Doesn’t Care About Taiwan
The Trump administration is populated with many staff and officials who are deeply concerned about China’s authoritarianism and expansionism. Secretary of State Marco Rubio certainly, but many others too at mid and lower levels of the administration. Quietly, at least at lower levels, the Trump administration is examining measures to counter China, including on Chinese investments and export controls. But those efforts are flooded by the deluge of counter-productive policies the administration is pursuing, from tariffs on allies, undermining Ukraine, destroying USAID and parts of the State Department (not reforming aid, but destroying it) and gutting Radio Free Asia and other agencies, initiatives and organizations that can be helpful in the fight against an authoritarian, expansionist China.
The big question is whether Trump himself actually care about Taiwan. He certainly does not care about democracy. It’s hard to believe he cares about the Taiwanese people. He doesn’t even seem to care about China, other than in terms of international trade issues. And he has often expressed his admiration for Xi Jinping, and his authoritarian powers.
So, one of my large worries, what keeps me up at night, is that Trump will negotiate a grand deal with China. And in that deal he will sacrifice Taiwan, signaling approval for China to take control of Taiwan. There are indications that Trump and Xi will meet at some point later in the year. Negotiations for a deal will take place before then. We need to remember that Trump thinks like a 19th century leader and might be fine with ceding parts of Asia to Xi, parts of Europe to Russia while he claims other parts of the world, including Canada and Denmark.
What we do know Trump cares about is trade deficits. At high levels the Trump administration appears to be trying to implement the ideas of Stephen Miran, the chair of the Council of Economic Advisors for the Trump administration. Last year he published A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System which essentially calls for reforming international trade and financial systems, with tariffs being one of the chief tools. This is what Trump appears to care about in relation to China and is a large focus of his international policy.
So even though Rubio and others care about China’s authoritarianism and expansionism, likely Trump does not. He wants a deal on trade. I would not be surprised if Trump sacrificed Taiwan in these negotiations to gain concessions on trade.
Remember that Trump is always and ever transactional—in everything. He also has not shown himself to be a good negotiator. This has been true in his business career and as president. Likely Xi Jinping realizes that he’ll never have a better opportunity to gain control over Taiwan, by hook, crook, blockade or invasion, than during the next four years of chaotic, transactional, 19th-century Trumpism.
This is all pretty worrisome. China has said it wants to take over Taiwan. In fact, Xi himself has said they shouldn’t let the issue fester. They are engaged in a massive military build-up and modernization, some of which is obviously focused on creating an ability to blockade and invade Taiwan. China is also using new equipment and personnel to practice blockading and invading Taiwan, conducting numerous exercises around the island-nation. It has increased its cyberespionage and is cutting cables to Taiwan. It continually interferes in Taiwan’s politics. China is also building up supply chain resilience to be invulnerable to any sanctions that might be imposed on it by the democratic world should it blockade or invade Taiwan. And finally, the current U.S. president does not care about democracy and certainly cares not a whit about the fate of Taiwanese.
So why am I not certain that China will invade Taiwan before the end of 2028? Ah, yes, the one reason why I think China might not try to forcibly seize Taiwan.
One Reason Why Not
Military is Unstable, Corrupt and May Not be Capable or Loyal
The main reason Xi Jinping may not blockade or invade Taiwan, despite his clearly wanting to take control of the country, is that he may not trust his military to be able to do so. As we saw above, China is engaged in a massive build-up of its military. But at the same time, Xi Jinping is engaged in a continuing corruption crackdown of the military. Will Xi feel he has sufficiently reformed the PLA by 2028? Will he trust it? Even with all the new shiny equipment and extensive training, will it be capable of conducting a highly complicated and risky invasion of Taiwan? Is the military willing to commit to such a risky endeavor?
In the last three years, Xi has removed a vice admiral, defense minister and member of the Central Military Commission, among many others. Just last week, there were rumors that He Weidong, also a member of the Military Commission, was detained.
For years it’s been known that officers often pay to get promoted in the PLA. In other words, you bribe your way to the top. Each promotion is costly. It is likely that procurement of weapons involves lots of corruption too. In the summer of 2023, Xi fired two generals in charge of the PLA’s Rocket Force unit. Apparently, these dismissals had to do with procurement fraud, making people wonder just how well China’s missiles will actually work in a military engagement.
Some question just how loyal the military is to Xi. They point to Xi convening a Communist Party Central Military Commission meeting last June. Internationale Politik reports that “Xi referred to political war as the ‘lifeline’ of the PLA, emphasized the need for party leadership to be upheld, and demanded that senior officers ‘introspect, engage in soul-searching reflections, and make earnest rectifications.’” That certainly sounds like a leader who is not particularly trustful of his military’s leadership.
Xi’s corruption crackdown on the military has been going on for years. That he still is replacing top brass even in the last few months presumably means there’s still lots of corruption…or disloyalty…or other issues, endemic in the Chinese military.
So, our best hope is that China’s military is too corrupt and incompetent to make an invasion of Taiwan possible. Or that it is not loyal to Xi. And that it will take a long time for Xi to fix this corruption and incompetence and solidify loyalty. It’s possible Xi won’t order an invasion of Taiwan before the end of 2028 because he doesn’t believe the PLA is ready or loyal.
I suppose it won’t be the first time in history humans were saved by the corruption and incompetence of its villains. But it’s a wobbly rack to hang our security hat on. Nonetheless, for now I must hope the one reason I don’t think China will invade Taiwan is enough to counter the seven reasons that I do.